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“I’m late! I’m late! For a very important date! No time to say
hello, goodbye! I’m late! I’m late! I’m late!” – The White Rabbit,
Alice in Wonderland
I. INTRODUCTION
A person who has filed a late request for a contested case hearing
might have as much reason to panic as the White Rabbit. While they
won’t lose their head, they may have waived their right to that
hearing.1
State and federal administrative agencies exercise a variety of
important functions, which may include the authority to hold “quasijudicial” hearings.2 Such administrative adjudications are generally in
* Alice Booher Johnson is a staff attorney at the Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings. The author would like to thank Administrative Law
Judges Henry Abrams and Mary Shock of the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings for their insightful questions and analyses, which provided the inspiration
for this Article. The author would also like to thank Denise Shaffer, Executive
Administrative Law Judge and Deputy Director of Operations, and Georgia Brady,
Executive Administrative Law Judge and Deputy Director of Quality Assurance,
for their encouragement and support for this Article.
 See, e.g., ARNOLD ROCHVARG, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MARYLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.1, at 121 (2011) (“Failure to request a hearing in a
timely fashion will mean that the right to a contested case hearing . . . has been
waived.”).
 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 292 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)
(explaining that the Federal Trade Commission, an “administrative body created by
Congress,” exercises an executive function “in the discharge and effectuation of its
quasi legislative or quasi judicial powers.”). In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has
emphasized that the “judicial function” may only be exercised by courts
enumerated in the Maryland Constitution. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of
Assessments of Prince George’s Cty., 343 A.2d 521, 526 (Md. 1975). While the
“[l]egislature may within limits delegate quasi-judicial functions to an
administrative agency . . . the delegation of these functions is not the delegation of
a judicial function or judicial authority.” Id. at 527 (emphasis added). Contra 1
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.3, at 47 (5th ed.
2010) (“Agencies, both pure Executive Branch and independent, make legislative
rules based on agency policy decisions virtually every day. Agencies of both types
execute the laws in every conceivable sense of the word. Agencies also adjudicate
far more disputes involving individual rights than all of the federal courts
combined—a function that would seem to bear most comfortably the label
‘judicial.’”). See also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
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the form of a “contested case” hearing, which has been defined as a
“formal evidentiary adversarial hearing.”3 These evidentiary hearings
often provide certain “flexible” procedural due process safeguards.4
While the nature of a filing deadline for a contested case hearing
might seem to be a fundamental aspect of due process in an
administrative adjudication, authoritative guidance on the subject—at
least among the states—is sparse and contradictory.
Courts have long addressed filing deadlines outside of contested
case hearings,5 more recently in the context of whether a reviewing

Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984)
(noting that “describing what the agencies do as ‘quasi-adjudication’ or ‘quasilegislation’” obscures, rather than answers, questions on the “forbidden conjoining
of powers” between the three branches of government).
 Lunde v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
Maryland’s APA defines a “contested case” as a “proceeding before an agency to
determine . . . a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person . . . or the
grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license, that is
required by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an
agency hearing.” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-202(d)(1) (West 2014). See
also REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 401 (Nat’l Conference of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010) (“This [article] applies to an adjudication
made by an agency in a contested case.”).
 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62, 267 (1970) (setting
forth due process standards in the termination of “statutory entitlements” and
reiterating that the “fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 349 (1976) (highlighting
that due process is “flexible” and holding that an “evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to the termination of disability benefits”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
Lytle, 821 A.2d 62, 69-70 (Md. 2003) (explaining that due process procedures are
determined by “balancing the individual and governmental interests affected by the
property deprivation”). See also Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative
Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493, 524 (1997) (arguing that “courts must be
vigilant in ensuring that flexible due process does not result in dilution of due
process”); Edward A. Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act:
Forty Years Old in 1997, 56 MD. L. REV. 196, 251 (1997) (“The contested case
model has proved workable in Maryland, despite the breadth of adjudication
covered. . . . The OAH in particular has adopted ‘flexible due process’ as its basic
credo.”).
 See, e.g., E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The
Worst Kind of Deadline—Except for All Others, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
151, 154 (2008) (“[T]he debate about jurisdictional deadlines . . . is really quite old.
Thousands of reported decisions, reaching back to the 1840s, have concluded that a
small group of deadlines—chief among them the time to appeal—are jurisdictional
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court exercises original6 or appellate7 jurisdiction. In Part II of this
Article, I provide an overview of subject matter jurisdiction in
relation to filing timeframes. I review the distinction between original
and appellate jurisdiction using Maryland case law and a sample
survey of other state case law to provide background to the question
of filing deadlines and hearing requests in administrative
adjudications. Generally, a statutory filing deadline in a court of
original jurisdiction is construed as a statute of limitations, which
may be waived or equitably tolled or estopped under certain
conditions.8 If, on the other hand, a filing timeframe is part of a
court’s jurisdiction—such as an appeal to a court with appellate
jurisdiction—then an untimely filing may not be waived by a party or
granted an exception by the court under equitable principles.9 State

or ‘jurisdictional in nature,’ and thus cannot be altered by the parties or ignored by
the courts.”).
 Original jurisdiction has been defined as “[a] court’s power to hear and
decide a matter before any other court can review the matter.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 982 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
Appellate jurisdiction has been defined as “[t]he power of a court to review
and revise a lower court’s decision.” Id. at 980 (emphasis added); see also Shell Oil
Co., 343 A.2d at 525 (“[A]ppellate jurisdiction does not arise until there is an initial
exercise of judicial power or authority by a court.” (emphasis added)).
! See, e.g., Poor, supra note 5, at 202 n.132 (“Statutory filing deadlines are
generally subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”);
People v. Keegan, 779 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating that
“[o]rdinary statutes of limitation present procedural bars that may be asserted as an
affirmative defense or waived” and holding that the filing period for a hearing in
the circuit court with original jurisdiction under the State’s constitution is “an
ordinary statute of limitations . . . that [can be] waived by the State”).
" See, e.g., Kim v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 714 A.2d 176, 179 (Md. 1998)
(“[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that an action for judicial review of an
administrative decision is an original action. It is not an appeal. . . . The time
requirements for filing appeals are ordinarily treated as jurisdictional in nature. . . .
[A]bsent a special statute or rule dealing with the matter . . . a prematurely filed
appeal must be dismissed by an appellate court because the appellate court has no
jurisdiction over the matter.”); Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d 160,
164 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (“On a petition for judicial review of an
administrative agency decision ‘the district court does not exercise original
jurisdiction vested in it by the constitution. It exercises appellate jurisdiction
conferred upon it by statute.’” (citation omitted)). See generally Mark A. Hall, The
Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 399-400 (1986)
(arguing that “appeal periods are like original jurisdiction limitation periods; they
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courts are far from uniform on whether the filing deadline in a
reviewing court is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived.
Moreover, in the administrative context, the demarcation between
original and appellate jurisdiction is of limited utility.
In Part III of this Article, I elaborate upon Supreme Court
precedent on administrative filing deadlines. Nearly thirty years ago,
Professor Mark Hall commented that the federal courts “have made a
fetish of their own authority by characterizing timing defects” in
“appellate and quasi appellate time limitations” as “jurisdictional.”10
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted an important bright line for
determining whether to classify such statutory time limitations as
jurisdictional.11 The Supreme Court characterizes filing deadlines—
including administrative appeal timeframes—as “quintessential
claim-processing rules” that are not jurisdictional unless Congress
clearly prescribes that a “procedural rule” is jurisdictional.12
In Part IV of this Article, I analyze the nature of filing deadlines
for hearing requests before various state agencies, with an emphasis
on Maryland’s scheme. The case law among the states is limited and
contradictory, which raises the question in Part V of how to proceed
with an untimely filing. What emerges from my review of time
limitations in state and Supreme Court cases is that whether a
jurisdictional bar exists is often a question of legislative intent.
Because of the harshness of jurisdictional deadlines, I recommend
that the relevant agency statute and regulations be carefully parsed to
determine if there is any flexibility in the filing deadline. I review
“good cause” exceptions and the Accardi Doctrine and apply the
foregoing principles to the filing timeframe in Maryland medical
assistance cases, concluding that the regulatory deadline is an
administrative statute of limitations. In summary, I urge the states,

involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not fundamental societal
interests [and] should therefore be subject to waiver by the parties”).
 Hall, supra note 9, at 399 & n.1, 401 (noting that the “attitude of the federal
courts is representative of that in the state courts as well”).
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011); see also Jessica Berch,
Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory
Subject Matter-Jurisdiction Defects, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 639, 647-48
(2014) (“The Supreme Court has concluded [that] time deadlines are generally not
jurisdictional . . . .”).
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especially under principles of flexible due process, to unmoor
themselves from “jurisdictional” time limitations and follow the
example of the Supreme Court in providing clarity and uniformity in
the area of administrative filing deadlines.
II. ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The timeframe in which to appeal is often couched in terms of
subject matter jurisdiction: “[T]he inveterate rule that a timely appeal
is jurisdictional is not limited to federal courts; it has long been a
fundamental precept of state court jurisprudence as well.”13 Subject
matter jurisdiction may be defined as “[j]urisdiction over the nature
of the case and the type of relief sought.”14 Subject matter
jurisdiction may not be waived, and defects in subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage in the proceedings.15 These
jurisdictional “appeals” are often understood as an appeal to a court
with appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction has been defined in
turn as “[t]he power of a court to review and revise a lower court’s
decision.”16 Yet, appeals are far broader than a proceeding in an
appellate court and may include any proceeding that is undertaken for
the purpose of reconsideration by a higher authority, for example, the
submission of an agency’s decision to a court for review.17 This
distinction is important because while the appeal timeframe before a
court with appellate jurisdiction may be a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction, the appeal timeframe before a reviewing court with
original jurisdiction might not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.



Poor, supra note 5, at 154-55.
BLACK’S, supra note 6, at 983.
 Berch, supra note 12, at 635, 638-39, 647-48 (2014) (“While other defects
may be waived, subject-matter jurisdiction stands alone as the single unwaivable
defect. . . . The Supreme Court . . . has struggled to define the boundaries of what
constitutes subject-matter jurisdiction.”); see also Williams v. Comm’n on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001) (“A conclusion that a
time limit is subject matter jurisdictional has very serious and final
consequences.”).
 BLACK’S, supra note 6, at 982.
 See id. at 117.
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B. Reviewing Courts
1. Maryland Case Law
Appeal timeframes before the Maryland appellate courts are
“jurisdictional in nature” and are not subject to waiver absent a
special statute or rule. In Kim v. Comptroller,18 the Court of Appeals
underscored the distinction between an original action (in a
reviewing court with original jurisdiction) and an appeal before a
court with appellate jurisdiction. Kim stated as follows:
[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that an action for judicial
review of an administrative decision is an original action. It is not an
appeal. . . . The time requirements for filing appeals are ordinarily
treated as jurisdictional in nature. . . . [A]bsent a special statute or
rule dealing with the matter . . . a prematurely filed appeal must be
dismissed by an appellate court because the appellate court has no
jurisdiction over the matter. . . . The same cannot be said, however,
of a prematurely filed petition for judicial review, because the time
requirements for filing a petition for judicial review are not
jurisdictional. It is in the nature of a statute of limitations.19
The court took pains to clarify the terminology because there are
significant consequences for a party if the time requirement is
jurisdictional. The appellate court must dismiss a premature or late
appeal; on the other hand, the circuit court will not bar a premature or
late petition for judicial review (original action) if the statute of
limitations defense was not raised in the defendant’s answer.20 Thus,
Kim clarified that the nature of a filing timeframe depends upon
whether the court exercises original or appellate jurisdiction. While
Maryland’s highest court has provided certain parameters on the
issue of timeframes and jurisdiction, it still leaves the adjudicating
agency in “Wonderland” since the agency performs a “quasi-judicial”

!

714 A.2d 176 (Md. 1998).
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
 Id.; see also State v. Sharfeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1214 (Md. 2004).
"
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function and does not technically exercise original or appellate
jurisdiction.21
2. Sample Survey of Other State Case Law
Many state courts have reviewed their constitutions and statutes
to determine whether a timely filing or “appeal” in a reviewing court
is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. While some
courts hold that a timely filing is necessary to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court, other courts hold that filing deadlines are
flexible and not a jurisdictional prerequisite.
In Iowa, the reviewing courts exercise appellate—rather than
original— jurisdiction over petitions for judicial review of agency
actions.22 In Cooper v. Kirkwood Community College, the Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s premature petition for judicial review
of an administrative agency decision was a “jurisdictional defect”
that could not be waived.23 Likewise, in Texas, while the Court of
Appeals did not differentiate between original and appellate
jurisdiction, it held that the statutory filing deadline under the Texas
Labor Code for judicial review of a final agency decision was a
“jurisdictional prerequisite” to the trial court’s review.24
Illinois’ and Indiana’s appellate courts have also addressed
statutory filing deadlines and “jurisdictional prerequisites” in the
lower courts but concluded in certain cases that the filing period was
either an “ordinary statute of limitations”25 or was “analogous to the


In an earlier opinion, the Court of Appeals emphasized that since an
administrative agency does not perform a judicial function (unless enumerated in
the Maryland Constitution), it does not exercise original jurisdiction; therefore,
review of the agency’s decision in the circuit court is an exercise of original rather
than appellate jurisdiction. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince
George’s Cty., 343 A.2d 521, 527 (Md. 1975). See also supra note 2.
 Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa
2013); see also Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d 160, 164 n.1 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2010) (“On a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency
decision ‘the district court does not exercise original jurisdiction vested in it by the
constitution. It exercises appellate jurisdiction conferred upon it by statute.’”
(citation omitted)).
 Cooper, 782 N.W.2d at 164 n.1, 167-68.
 Stoker v. TWC Comm’rs, 402 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App. 2013).
 People v. Keegan, 779 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
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statute of limitations.”26 In People v. Keegan, the Appellate Court of
Illinois contrasted statutory “jurisdictional time limitations” for
administrative review proceedings with statutes of limitations for
other proceedings. Keegan cited to its supreme court, which
explained that “except in the area of administrative review, the
jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the constitution.”27 The
statutory filing period before the reviewing court was a jurisdictional
prerequisite “[b]ecause the circuit court was exercising special
statutory jurisdiction under the administrative review law.”28 The
supreme court emphasized that labeling time limitations in statutory
actions as “jurisdictional” is “not a rule of general applicability to all
statutory causes of action.”29 Against this backdrop, Keegan held that
in those cases where the circuit court had “original subject matter
jurisdiction under [the] state’s constitution,” the filing period for a
hearing “is an ordinary statute of limitations—not a jurisdictional
prerequisite that could not be waived by the State.”30
In Packard v. Shoopman, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that
the timely filing of a petition for judicial review to the Tax Court is
“analogous to [a] statute of limitations” and does not “affect the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tax Court.”31 Packard stated that
the “timely filing of a complaint in the Tax Court is ‘jurisdictional’
only in the sense that it is a statutory prerequisite to the docketing of
an appeal in the Tax Court” but acknowledged that “statutory
‘jurisdictional’ requirements in other statutes may require a different
result” depending upon the “nature of the court and the particular
statutory language.”32
In Rhode Island and Virginia, the appellate courts did not tether
the statutory filing deadline for judicial review to subject matter
jurisdiction. The plaintiff in McAninch v. State of Rhode Island
Department of Training & Labor came before the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island after the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s untimely


Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ind. 2006).
Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177,
185 (Ill. 2002).
! Id. at 187.
" Id.
 Keegan, 779 N.E.2d at 906.
 852 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (Ind. 2006).
 Id. at 931.






 "

    

75

administrative appeal—finding it was “appellate in nature”—for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.33 The court highlighted that “the real
issue before the Superior Court was whether that tribunal, which
unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction, should have
exercised that jurisdiction.”34 The court stated that while “[s]tatutes
prescribing the time and procedure to be followed by a litigant
attempting to secure appellate review are to be strictly construed,”35
the “timeframes set forth in those statutes are [not] utterly
inflexible.”36 The court found that the statutory timeframe for
administrative review was guided by case law and court rules and,
upon review of those sources, held that the superior court rules
applied to the computation of time for the administrative appeal.37
In Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning
Appeals of Fairfax County, the Supreme Court of Virginia revisited
the term “jurisdiction” in order to determine the nature of the filing
timeframe for administrative review by the circuit court.38 The court
elaborated that the “filing requirement set by the General Assembly
does not define the class of cases, i.e. the subject matter jurisdiction,
over which the circuit court has authority to adjudicate.”39 The court
held that the filing timeframe was an “other jurisdictional element”
subject to waiver if not properly raised.40
This survey illustrates the variation among the state courts on the
issue of the nature of filing deadlines in the reviewing courts. More
specifically, these analyses highlight that statutory filing deadlines
may not be inextricably intertwined with subject matter jurisdiction.



64 A.3d 84, 86-87 (R.I. 2013).
Id. at 87 (quoting Narragansett Elect. Co. v. Saccoccio, 43 A.3d 40, 44 (R.I.
2012)).
 Id. at 88 (quoting Rivera v. Emps. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 70 A.3d 905, 912 (R.I.
2013)).
 Id.
 Id. at 88- 90.
! 626 S.E.2d 374, 378 (Va. 2006).
" Id. at 379.
 Id. at 381.
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON FILING DEADLINES
Courts often reiterate that timely notice of an “appeal” is
“mandatory and jurisdictional.”41 The time limits imposed under the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have historically been
interpreted as jurisdictional.42 Outside of traditional appeals from one
court to another, however, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases,
has made significant incursions into “jurisdictional” time
limitations.43
A. Scarborough v. Principi
In Scarborough v. Principi, the Supreme Court examined the
filing period in a provision under the Equal Access to Justice Act
authorizing the payment of attorney fees to a prevailing party in an
action against the United States.44 The Court began by clarifying that
the timeframe for the fee award “does not concern the federal courts’
‘subject-matter jurisdiction.’”45 Although Scarborough addressed an
application filing period rather than an appeal, the Court
highlighted—citing its recent decision in Kontrick v. Ryan—the
“more than occasional” misuse of the term “jurisdictional” to
describe “emphatic time prescriptions” in rules.46



Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 371.
 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67,
82 (2009) (stating that “we have reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the time
limitation for filing a notice of appeal” to a court of appeals but finding that
“nothing in the [Railway Labor] Act elevates to jurisdictional status the obligation
to conference minor disputes or to prove conferencing”). Id. at 80.
 541 U.S. 401, 405 (2004).
 Id. at 413.
 Id. (quoting in part Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). Kontrick v.
Ryan, written by Justice Ginsburg (who also wrote Scarborough), was a key case
disentangling timeframes from subject matter jurisdiction. For a detailed history on
jurisdictional deadlines, see E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of
Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 181 (2007).
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B. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers
The Court steamed along in unthreading “claim-processing” rules
from subject matter jurisdiction in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.47 In Union Pacific, the Court
decided whether it was proper for the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, an arbitration panel, to dismiss employee claims for “lack of
jurisdiction” because of a conferencing requirement during the prearbitration internal grievance process.48 In the underlying case, a
panel representative had raised on his own initiative that the record
included no proof of conferencing and could not be supplemented
because conferencing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the panel’s
exercise of authority as an “appellate tribunal.”49 The Court
underscored that “the word ‘jurisdiction’ has been used by courts,
including this Court, to convey many, too many, meanings . . . .”50
The Court clarified that subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a
tribunal’s power to hear a case” while a “claim-processing rule . . .
does not reduce the adjudicatory domain of a tribunal.”51 The Court
referred to a number of its decisions in which it held that procedural
requirements, such as timeframes, were “nonjurisdictional and
forfeitable” but “reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the time
limitation for filing a notice of appeal” to a court of appeals.52 After
reviewing the conferencing requirement, the Court held that “nothing
in the [Railway Labor Act] elevates to jurisdictional status the
obligation to conference minor disputes or to prove conferencing.”53



558 U.S. 67 (2009).
Id. at 71, 77.
" Id. at 77-78.
 Id. at 81 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009).
 Id. at 80.
!
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C. Henderson v. Shinseki
In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court squarely addressed whether
an administrative appeal had “jurisdictional consequences” and held
that the 120-day filing deadline for an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was not jurisdictional.54 In so
holding, the Court again disentangled “claim-processing rules” from
jurisdiction, explaining that “[b]ecause the consequences that attach
to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in recent
cases to bring some discipline to the use of this term.”55 The Court
emphasized as follows: “Among the types of rules that should not be
described as jurisdictional are what we have called ‘claim-processing
rules.’ . . . Filing deadlines, such as the 120-day filing deadline at
issue here, are quintessential claim-processing rules.”56 The Court
further elaborated that “Congress is free to attach the conditions that
go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that we would prefer to call a
claim-processing rule.”57 Therefore, even though the Court did not
consider procedural filing deadlines to be inherently tied to subject
matter jurisdiction, the Court explained that it must look to “see if
there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be
‘jurisdictional.’”58 The Henderson Court, in ascertaining Congress’
intent on whether the administrative deadline was meant to have
“jurisdictional attributes,”59 distinguished a “century’s worth of
precedent and practice in American courts”60 on jurisdictional
appeals from one court to another court from, in this case, “review by
an Article I tribunal as part of a unique administrative scheme.”61
While the Supreme Court did not change the “jurisdictional
character”62 of the time limitation for filing a notice of appeal for
certain traditional appeals from one court to another, it did adopt a


562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011).
Id. at 435.
 Id. (emphasis added).
 Id.
! Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011).
" Id. at 438.
 Id. at 436 (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208 n.2 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
 Id. at 438.
 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009).
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“bright line”63 for determining whether to classify statutory time
limitations as jurisdictional: “quintessential claim-processing rules”
are not jurisdictional unless clearly prescribed by Congress. In the
following case, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision
that reiterated and applied this bright line to appeals to the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Provider Reimbursement
Review Board.64
D. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center
In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, Medicare
providers had appealed an initial determination of reimbursement for
inpatient services to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
more than ten years beyond the 180-day statutory deadline.65 The
Court was asked to decide whether the filing deadline was
jurisdictional and, if not, whether a “good cause” regulation
extending the limitation up to three years was authorized under the
governing statute and whether the doctrine of equitable tolling could
be applied to this type of administrative appeal.66 The Court
reiterated that it had adopted a “readily administrable bright line”67
test to “ward off profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction.’”68 In this
test, a court inquires whether Congress has “clearly stated” that the
time limitation is jurisdictional; in the absence of such a clear
statement, courts should treat the filing deadline as
nonjurisdictional.69 The Court highlighted “what it would mean were



Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 516 (2006)).
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
 Id. at 821.
 Id.
 Id. at 824 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
! Id.
" Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). The Court
further explained that “[t]his is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in
order to speak clearly. We consider context, including this Court’s interpretations
of similar provisions in many years past, as probative of whether Congress
intended a particular provision to rank as jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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we to type the governing statute ‘jurisdictional’”70: “Not only could
there be no equitable tolling. The Secretary’s regulation providing for
a good-cause extension would fall as well.”71 The Court examined
the congressional language and held that the time limitation was not
jurisdictional and “does not bar the modest [good cause] extension
contained in the Secretary’s regulation.”72
The Court then addressed whether the doctrine of equitable
tolling could be applied to the late appeals. The Court emphasized
that equitable tolling would “gut” the good cause regulation that
limited the extension to no later than three years after a Notice of
Program Reimbursement was issued to the provider.73 While the
Court had applied, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,74 a
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling to suits against the United
States, the Court stated that “[t]his case is of a different order” and
that the presumption had never been applied to an agency’s internal
appeal deadline.75 Moreover, the Court noted that the statutory
scheme at issue was not designed to be “unusually protective of
claimants.”76 The Court ultimately held that equitable tolling did not
apply to “administrative appeals of the kind here considered . . . .”77
This line of Supreme Court cases clearly outlines that “administrative
appeals of the kind here considered” are not tethered to the
“mandatory and jurisdictional” time limitations in traditional appeals
unless Congress has clearly stated that the time limitation is
jurisdictional.



Id. at 824 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
 Id. at 826.
 Id. at 826.
 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 827 (2013).
 Id. at 828 (quoting Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 829.
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IV. NATURE OF FILING DEADLINES FOR HEARING REQUESTS
BEFORE STATE AGENCIES
A. State Survey
Some state courts have addressed the nature of filing deadlines
for hearing requests before state agencies—often in cases prior to the
recent line of Supreme Court cases—with mixed results that
predominately favor adherence to jurisdictional time limitations.78
For example, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in finding that
a terminated employee filed a timely petition for a contested case
hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), stated
without further elaboration that “timely filing of a petition is
necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the agencies as well
as the courts . . . .”79 The Court of Appeals of Washington also
affixed jurisdictional time limitations to hearing requests before the
OAH.80 However, the court clarified in a footnote that a late filing
did not technically divest the OAH Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
of subject matter jurisdiction because the “legislature has granted
ALJs subject matter jurisdiction to conduct administrative
hearings.”81 Instead, the court explained, the ALJ cannot “exercise
jurisdiction” when a party fails to timely request a hearing.82
The Appellate Court of Illinois, in holding that the Educational
Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction over an untimely
filed unfair labor practice charge, examined its precedent indicating
!

I conducted various searches in Lexis and Westlaw for state court cases
addressing the nature of administrative time limitations. I could not find, unlike in
the above surveys of the state reviewing courts and of the Supreme Court, a clear
line of cases on administrative time limitations. While it was my intent to capture
as many key cases as possible on the subject, I do not claim that the following
discussion provides an exhaustive review of state court cases.
" Gray v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, 560 S.E.2d 394, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see
also Little v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., No. COA09-441, 2010 N.C.
App. LEXIS 1458, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that the Office of
Administrative Hearings lacks subject matter jurisdiction when a contested case
petition is untimely filed).
! Pal v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 342 P.3d 1190 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2015).
! Id. at 1197 n.6.
! Id.





82

              

!"

that “time limitations upon bringing actions before administrative
agencies are matters of jurisdiction which cannot be tolled.”83 The
court elaborated that a time limitation is jurisdictional “if the right
being asserted is one unknown to the common law” because “the
time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of
the tribunal to hear the matter.”84 Otherwise, the court explained, a
time limitation is “merely a procedural matter” if it is based upon a
common law right.85 Therefore, in Illinois, statutory time limits for
administrative actions involving “new rights” are held to be
jurisdictional.86
The Texas Supreme Court held that a statutory time limit was a
“prerequisite” to the Texas Workforce Commission’s jurisdiction
over employment discrimination claims under the Texas Commission
on Human Rights Act (TCHRA).87 The court detailed that while
Congress expanded the Title VII limitations period under the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the Texas Legislature did not similarly
amend the TCHRA.88 Because the court found that the TCHRA and
Title VII “are no longer analogous,”89 it examined a Texas legislative
amendment “mandat[ing] that all statutory prerequisites to suit are
jurisdictional in suits against government entities”90 under statutory
interpretation principles in order to determine “whether the 180-day
filing deadline in the TCHRA [was] a statutory prerequisite to suit as
contemplated by” the amendment.91 The court held that the
timeframe was a statutory prerequisite and concluded that the
claimant’s suit was jurisdictionally barred because it was untimely
filed with the Commission.92
The Superior Court of New Jersey also engaged in statutory
analysis in order to determine whether the statutory deadline for a
!

Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd.,
561 N.E.2d 331, 333, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
! Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
! Id.
! Id. at 334.
! Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. 2012).
!! Id. at 506.
!" Id. at 509.
" Id. at 510.
" Id. at 513.
" Id. at 513-14.
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license renewal application was “mandatory or directory.”93 The
court explained that it had discerned two rationales in deciding
whether a statutory deadline “for the public to seek relief from State
agencies” was directory or mandatory94: the jurisdiction rationale95
and the legislative scheme analysis.96 In concluding that the deadline
was mandatory—and therefore could not be relaxed by the agency—
the court “scrutinize[d] the legislation at issue” because “[e]ven
under the jurisdiction rationale” whatever the “Legislature intended
controls the analysis.”97
While variations of the “jurisdiction rationale” seem to prevail in
the state courts, the Supreme Court of Connecticut requires “a strong
showing of legislative intent that such a time limit is jurisdictional”
and concluded that the 180-day filing deadline for a discrimination
complaint before the Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities (Commission) was mandatory but not jurisdictional.98
The court first highlighted, in explaining the court’s “presumption in
favor of subject matter jurisdiction,” that subject matter jurisdiction
“has very serious and final consequences.”99 The court then
elaborated that in seeking to discern a “strong showing of legislative
intent” for a subject matter jurisdictional time limitation, the court
interprets the statute “according to well established principles of
statutory construction.”100 As the court examined the intent of the

" Cavallaro 556 Valley St. Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 796
A.2d 938, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The court explained that if a
“statutory time frame is mandatory, then modification or relaxation may be granted
only by the Legislature” whereas if a “particular statutory deadline is only directory
. . . then the agency would have authority to excuse the untimeliness.” Id. at 94041.
" Id. at 941.
" “The jurisdiction rationale, reflects the well known principle that
administrative agencies derive all their powers from the Legislature.” Id.
" The “legislative scheme analysis” “requires an analysis of the statutory
scheme involved.” Id. at 941-42.
" Id. at 943-44.
"! Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651,
661 (Conn. 2001) (emphasis added).
"" Id. at 651.
 Id. at 651-53. The court explained that
[i]n seeking to discern that [legislative] intent, we look to the words of the
statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,
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statute, it outlined a number of policy considerations “for declining to
read the legislation as embodying the required strong showing of
legislative intent to impose subject matter jurisdictional
constraints.”101 For instance, the court stated that “[t]he audience of
the provision . . . may not be fully aware of the necessity of filing
within the statutory time periods, and may even fail to do so because
of justifiable, equitable factors.”102 The court stated, moreover, that
the Commission “routinely entertains untimely complaints when the
parties present adequate reasons for the delay” and that “in
appropriate circumstances entertaining untimely complaints serves
those [public] interests.”103
The court further concluded that although the time limitation was
not jurisdictional, it was mandatory and “must be complied with,
absent such factors as consent, waiver or equitable tolling.”104 The
court elaborated that the mandatory time limitation did not operate
like a “pure statute of limitations” because “[c]omplaints filed with
the [C]ommission are not the same as actions filed in court.”105 The
court, accenting the agency’s discretion, concluded that the
Commission—not just a party as a special defense— may “raise the
timeliness issue in conformity with its institutional responsibilities in
the petition process.”106
On the other hand, the District Court of Appeal of Florida simply
stated that “the statutory deadline for requesting an administrative
hearing is not jurisdictional.”107 The court addressed an “equitable
argument” when an employee filed an employment discrimination
to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to
existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject
matter.
Id. at 653.
 Id. at 661.
 Id. (footnote omitted).
 Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645,
651 (Conn. 2001).
 Id. at 661; but cf. Cavallaro, 796 A.2d at 940-41 (explaining that if a
statutory time frame is mandatory, then modification or relaxation may be granted
only by the Legislature).
 Williams, 777 A.2d at 664.
 Id.
 Watson v. Brevard Cty. Clerk of the Circuit Ct., 937 So. 2d 1264, 1265
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote omitted).
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complaint one day after the deadline.108 The court explained that
because the deadline was not jurisdictional, the “doctrine of equitable
tolling [could] be applied to extend an administrative filing deadline”
when a plaintiff “has been misl[ed] or lulled into action, has in some
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has
timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum.”109 The court found,
however, that although an equitable argument could be asserted,
“[n]one of these circumstances are applicable here.”110
B. Analysis of Maryland’s Scheme
Maryland’s appellate courts have not directly addressed the
nature of filing deadlines in an administrative scheme, but the
opinions suggest that a statutory timeframe would generally be
construed as a condition precedent to the right of action but not as a
condition precedent to the agency’s subject matter jurisdiction.111 A
!
"

Id.
Id. (citing Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla.

1988)).


Id.
See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 985 A.2d 1183, 1198 (Md.
2009) (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[W]here a statute containing a
limitation period creates both the right and the remedy, the limitation period
constitutes a condition precedent to maintaining suit, not merely a statute of
limitations subject to waiver if not raised by the defendant as an affirmative
defense.”); see also State ex rel. Stasciewicz v. Parks, 129 A. 793, 794 (Md. 1925)
(“In most jurisdictions the courts have held that all the provisions of these statutes
[that create a new cause of action], including that fixing the time within which the
action must be brought, are essential to the maintenance of the suit.”).
In a key case discussed in detail infra on the distinction between a statute of
limitations and a condition precedent, State v. Sharafeldin, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated in a footnote, while discussing federal statutes similar to the State
statute at issue, that
[w]e need not complicate the issue by addressing it in terms of whether the
defense is “jurisdictional” in nature. . . . The relevant focus is on whether the time
limitation for bringing an action for breach of contract is a non-waivable, nontollable condition to the waiver of immunity. If it is and the condition is not met, an
action against the State must be dismissed because the State remains immune from
suit, not because the court is without jurisdiction.
854 A.2d 1208, 1215 n.5 (Md. 2004) (emphasis added).
In Engineering Management Services, Inc. v. Maryland State Highway
Administration, a case decided by the Court of Appeals a year before Sharafeldin,
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condition precedent operates in many respects like a jurisdictional
bar and is non-waivable and non-tollable and can be raised at any
time.112 A statute of limitations, on the other hand, is subject to
waiver by the failure of a respondent to raise the defense in a proper
manner, but it is not subject to discretionary extension.113 Equitable
exceptions, such as tolling and estoppel,114 may also be available
under a statute of limitations but these exceptions are narrow.115
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Sharafeldin116 is a key
opinion on the distinction between a statute of limitations and a
condition precedent. The court addressed whether a statutory
timeframe for breach of contract claims against the State
“constitute[d] a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and
thus to the right of action itself against the State or [was], instead,
the court “comment[ed] on” a “potentially erroneous” determination made by the
Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (Board) that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear a contested case appeal on a procurement claim because the petition for a
first level appeal was allegedly untimely (but not initially raised by the agency) and
an “absolute” condition precedent to the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction. 825
A.2d 966, 969, 981 (Md. 2003). The court concluded that the Board’s “analysis
appears incorrect” and that “the statute of limitations in question here is not an
issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 981, 985. The court further elaborated
that “[s]imply because a statutory provision directs a court or an adjudicatory
agency to decide a case in a particular way, if certain circumstances are shown,
does not create an issue going to the court’s or agency’s subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. at 984.
 See, e.g., Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 610 (Md. 2010) (“A condition
precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be
raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not
satisfied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d at 1215 n.5.
 S.B. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 6 A.3d 329, 341 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2010).
 In Engineering Management, the court stated, in further explaining why the
Board should not have dismissed the contractor’s claim on summary disposition,
that
[b]ecause a condition precedent can be met by estoppel, and estoppel is a
factual matter which can be determined only upon a full hearing on the merits, it is
inappropriate to view a statute [of limitations] which exists as a condition precedent
to a claim in a summary judgment context to be a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction to which issues of estoppel and waiver may not be considered [under
Maryland administrative law].
825 A.2d at 983 (emphasis added).
 See, e.g., Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 537-38 (D. Md. 2014).
 854 A.2d 1208.
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merely a statute of limitations.”117 The statutory provision provided
that “[a] claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files
suit within 1 year . . . .”118 The court held that the filing deadline was
not a statute of limitations but a condition to the action itself and that
“[t]he waiver of the State’s immunity vanishes at the end of the oneyear period.”119
In reaching its holding, the court emphasized that the “nature and
effect” of the deadline was a “matter of statutory construction” and
reviewed the statute for its legislative intent.120 The court stated:
[I]n attempting to divine legislative intent, we look first to the
words of the statute, but if the true legislative intent cannot readily be
determined from the statutory language alone, we look to other
indicia of the intent, including the title to the bill, the structure of the
statute, the inter-relationship of its various provisions, its legislative
history, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal
effect of various competing constructions.121
The court was concerned about construing the deadline as a
“mere statute of limitations, waivable at will by State agencies or
their respective attorneys,” as “limitations is an affirmative defense
that can be waived and that is waived unless raised in the defendant’s
answer.”122 The court highlighted the use of the term “barred” in the
applicable statute and stated that “traditional statutes of limitations . .
. normally state only that an action ‘shall be filed within’ the
allowable period.”123 The court then explained that when “a
limitation period is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action it
is not to be considered as an ordinary statute of limitations, but is to
be considered as a limitation upon the right as well as the remedy”
and concluded that the time limitation in the statute was a condition
to the waiver of immunity and was not subject to waiver or tolling.124


Id. at 1209.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 1219.
 Id. at 1212.
 Id. at 1212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 Id. at 1214 (emphasis in original).
 Id.
 Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); cf.
Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 561
N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that a time limitation is
!
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In Maryland, it is probably most apt to analyze filing timeframes
for contested case hearings under a statute of limitations and
condition precedent paradigm. In a Court of Special Appeals case
prior to Sharafeldin, Maryland Securities Commissioner v. U.S.
Securities Corp., the Appellant argued that the statute of limitations
embodied in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not
apply to administrative actions for monetary fines or penalties.125
The court agreed that the statute applied “only to judicial proceedings
as opposed to administrative hearings”126 and explained its holding
based upon the “spirit, reasoning, and holding” of its majority
opinion in an earlier case, which stated that “an administrative
hearing was not a ‘prosecution’ or ‘suit’ within the meaning of [the
Courts and Judicial Article], and (2) the underlying purpose of
protecting the public from unscrupulous practices by [professionals
licensed by an agency] preempted the defense of limitations.”127
While Maryland Securities Commissioner held that a specific
statute of limitations in a judicial proceeding should not be exported
to an administrative scheme, it did not directly stand for the
proposition that a limitations period in an administrative scheme
could not be interpreted as a statute of limitations. Moreover, in
Engineering Management Services, Inc. v. Maryland State Highway
Administration, a Court of Appeals case decided a year before
Sharafeldin, the court “comment[ed] on” a “potentially erroneous”
determination made by the Maryland State Board of Contract
Appeals that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a contested case
appeal on a procurement claim because the petition for a first level
appeal was allegedly untimely (but not initially raised by the
agency).128 The court concluded that the “administrative statute of
limitations” pertinent to the agency’s appeal “is not an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction.”129

jurisdictional “if the right being asserted is one unknown to the common law”
because “the time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of
the tribunal to hear the matter.”).
 716 A.2d 290, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
 Id.
 Id. at 299.
! 825 A.2d 966, 981 (Md. 2003).
" Id. at 981, 984-85 (emphasis added). For a more detailed discussion of this
case, see supra note 111.
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V. HOW TO PROCEED?
A. Statutory Construction
The preceding sections illustrate the continued vitality of
jurisdictional time limitations but also demonstrate that statutory
filing deadlines are generally not an inherent element of subject
matter jurisdiction.130 Instead, the consensus that emerges from my
review of state and Supreme Court cases is that the legislature
dictates whether a statutory filing timeframe is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an agency’s authority to hear a case. The Supreme
Court is clear that in the federal landscape administrative filing
deadlines are “quintessential claim-processing rules” but that
“Congress is free” to attach the jurisdictional label.131 The Superior
Court of New Jersey described what might be summarized as the
“jurisdiction rationale” in the varied State landscape: whatever the
“Legislature intended controls the analysis.”132
Because of the harshness of jurisdictional deadlines, the
adjudicating agency should determine whether there is any flexibility
in the filing deadline. Unless a State’s appellate court is explicit that,
for instance, the “timely filing of a petition is necessary to confer
subject matter jurisdiction”133 on the adjudicating agency, the time
limitation in the authorizing statute should be carefully reviewed for
its legislative intent under principles of statutory construction. These
principles for discerning legislative intent may be summarized as
follows:

 See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of
Fairfax Cty., 626 S.E.2d 374, 379 (Va. 2006) (“[The] filing requirement set by the
General Assembly does not define the class of cases, i.e. the subject matter
jurisdiction, over which the circuit court has authority to adjudicate.”); but cf.
Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 561
N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that a time limitation is
jurisdictional “if the right being asserted is one unknown to the common law”
because “the time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of
the tribunal to hear the matter.”).
 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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[W]e look first to the words of the statute, but if the true
legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory
language alone, we look to other indicia of the intent, including the
title to the bill, the structure of the statute, the inter-relationship of its
various provisions, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the
relative rationality and legal effect of various competing
constructions.134
B. Good Cause Provisions
The Supreme Court highlighted that a good cause regulatory
extension “would fall” under a jurisdictional time limitation.135 A
legislature or regulatory body may expressly grant, however, a good
cause exception to a non-jurisdictional filing timeframe.136 And any
such good cause exception in a statute or regulation tends to support
that the filing timeframe is not jurisdictional.137 Indeed, various state
 State v. Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Md. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 653 (Conn. 2001) (stating that in “seeking to discern
that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and
circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed
to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law
principles governing the same general subject matter.”).
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (“We
reiterate what it would mean were we to type the governing statute . . .
‘jurisdictional.’ . . . Not only could there be no equitable tolling. The Secretary’s
regulation providing for a good-cause extension would fall as well.” (citations
omitted)).
 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether there was good cause
to extend the deadline for the filing of a proper certificate of qualified expert,
which operated as a condition precedent to the claim. Although the court did not
find good cause to extend the deadline, it highlighted the flexibility in the “deadline
extension provision” provided by the statute, which served as an “escape valve[]
for the harshness of the penalty . . . .” Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 612 (Md.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 A good cause exception in a statute would certainly support legislative
intent for a non-jurisdictional timeframe. A good cause exception in the relevant
agency regulations would also provide support that the filing timeframe is not
jurisdictional, although the regulation could be felled by a court if it was found to
be outside the scope of the enabling statute. See, e.g., Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824;
see generally JoAnne Sweeny, Filling in the Gaps: The Scope of Administrative
Agencies’ Power to Enact Regulations, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 621 (2006).
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agencies have provided good cause regulatory exceptions for
untimely hearing requests. For example, under Oregon’s
administrative rules for a “late request for hearing” in its employment
department, the regulation provides as follows:
“Good cause” exists when an action, delay, or failure to act arises
from an excusable mistake or from factors beyond an applicant’s
reasonable control. . . . The appellant shall set forth the reason(s) for
filing a late request for hearing in a written statement, which the
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) shall consider in
determining whether good cause exists for the late filing, and
whether the request was filed within a reasonable time.138
Other states, such as California, Connecticut, and Michigan, have
also enacted regulatory provisions providing for good cause
extensions to certain late filings.139 While these extensions provide
for flexibility in the filing deadline, the adjudicating agency should
apply these exceptions carefully in order to avoid arbitrary or
capricious decisions.140

!

OR. ADMIN. R. 471-040-0010(1), (4).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 599.904(c) (“Except as otherwise limited by
statute or case law, the Department of Personnel Administration or the Director
may allow such an appeal to be filed within 30 days after the end of the period in
which the appeal should have been filed if the petitioner demonstrates good cause
for a late filing.”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-451(t)-5(a) (“[A] grievance shall
be filed not later than forty-five calendar days after the receipt of notice of the
action complained of, unless good cause is shown for a late filing, as determined by
the client rights officer.”); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 451.2601 (“If a pleading or other
paper is not filed in accordance with applicable time limits, the right of a party to
make that filing is waived. The administrator in its discretion may, upon a showing
of good cause for the late filing, permit the late filing of a pleading or other
paper.”).
 See, e.g., 1 M.L.E. What Constitutes an Improper Delegation of Power § 4
(2009) (“A statute or ordinance placing discretionary power in an administrative
agency must furnish standards for those who administer such power in order to
avoid arbitrary decisions . . . .”); Falcone v. O’Connor, 986 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“[The licensing official] did not abuse her discretion in
denying petitioner’s application . . . . [The] official is vested with considerable
discretion in ruling on a permit application and may deny it for any good cause.
This Court will not disturb such a determination unless it is arbitrary or capricious.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
"
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C. Accardi Doctrine
Under the Accardi Doctrine, named for the United States
Supreme Court case United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,141
administrative agencies must generally follow their own rules and
regulations.142 While Accardi “involved much more than mere
technical violations of an internal agency regulation pertaining to the
orderly transaction of agency business,” subsequent Supreme Court
cases have limited the Doctrine by providing an exemption for
“agency housekeeping regulations” unless a violation of such
regulations causes substantial prejudice.143 As discussed earlier in
this Article, an agency cannot waive a jurisdictional deadline or a
time limitation that is a condition precedent.144 Moreover, an agency
does not have discretion to waive a statute of limitations on the basis
of good cause.145 If a timeframe is read to be a “claim-processing”
rule that does not operate like a “pure statute of limitations,”
however, then an adjudicating agency might arguably waive it under



347 U.S. 260 (1954).
Pollock v. Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review, 823 A.2d 626, 639-40 (Md. 2003);
see also ROCHVARG, supra note 1, § 22.2, at 272-73.
 See Pollock, 823 A.2d at 637-38.
 See discussion supra Part II, IV.B.
 See, e.g., S.B. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 6 A.3d 329, 341
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“[T]he deadline [for judicial review] has consistently
been treated as an absolute statute of limitations, subject to waiver by failure of a
respondent to raise the defense in a proper manner but not subject to discretionary
extension. . . . The Court of Appeals has explained that it deliberately changed the
former rule governing judicial review of administrative agency decision, by
eliminating judicial authority to extend the filing period for good cause.” (emphasis
added)); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Neal, 864 A.2d 287, 294 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2004) (“In Colao we recognized that rule 7-203, which governs the
time for filing a petition for judicial review, does not confer discretion on the
circuit court to accept an untimely filed petition, and therefore operates as a statute
of limitations.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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the Accardi exception.146 Yet, the waiver may be vacated if prejudice
is shown.147
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was directly confronted
with the issue of whether an administrative board should have waived
the filing deadline for a petitioner’s untimely appeal because the
agency had not met several of its time limitations.148 The court first
noted that the petitioner had not raised any objections to—or availed
himself of any remedies for—the agency’s tardiness throughout the
appeal process.149 The court then highlighted that under the State’s
Administrative Procedure Act, agencies must follow their own rules
and regulations and concluded that it was proper for the
Administrative Board to dismiss the untimely appeal.150 In light of
the Accardi Doctrine—coupled with the murky nature of
administrative filing timeframes—an adjudicating agency should not
generally exercise its discretion in waiving the filing deadline for a
late hearing request unless a good cause exception is expressly
granted in the statute or regulation.
D. Maryland’s Medical Assistance Case Study
Medical Assistance (MA) is provided through Maryland’s
participation in the federal Medicaid program.151 Under Maryland’s
MA program, an appellant must request an MA fair hearing within
ninety days of the receipt of the notification of eligibility or of

 Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645,
664 (Conn. 2001) (stating that the administrative time limitation did not operate
like a “pure statute of limitations” and accenting the agency’s discretion to raise the
timeliness issue “sua sponte”).
 See, e.g., Pollock, 823 A.2d at 630, 650 (adopting a “modif[ied]” Accardi
Doctrine for administrative hearings in Maryland and holding that “a complainant
must . . . show prejudice to have the agency action invalidated”).
! In re Murdock, 943 A.2d 757, 763 (N.H. 2008).
" Id. at 764.
 Id.
 See What Is Medicaid?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
https://mmcp.dhmh.maryland.gov/pages/Medicaid-Medical-AssistanceOverview.aspx (Jan. 5, 2015) (stating that “[e]ach state establishes its own
eligibility standards, benefits package, provider requirements, payment rates, and
program administration under broad federal guidelines).
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services provided or denied.152 The ninety-day timeframe is codified
in both the state and federal regulations rather than in the authorizing
statutes, and neither regulation specifically mandates that the filing
deadline is jurisdictional.153 There is no good cause exception
expressly granted in the statutes or regulations. In order to determine
the nature of the filing timeframe, the principles outlined in the
preceding sections of this Article may be applied.
Under Supreme Court precedent, the federal filing deadline is a
“quintessential claim-processing rule” that is not jurisdictional unless
“clearly stated” by Congress.154 In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
Medical Center, where the Court was asked to decide whether the
filing deadline for Medicare providers was jurisdictional, the Court
examined the congressional language and held that the time
limitation was not jurisdictional.155 The Sebelius Court, however, did
not specifically examine the regulation at issue here. Moreover, the
limitation period at issue is under a state plan administered by
Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene rather than
directly administered through the federal government.
In accordance with the Medicaid program, Maryland’s limitation
period must comply with federally mandated standards and the due
process opportunity to be heard.156 Maryland’s appellate courts have
construed statutory time limitations more strictly than the Supreme
Court157 and have applied the rules of statutory construction to



MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.16.04; see also 42 C.F.R. § 431.221(d) (2014).
MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.16.04.
 See supra Part III.
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013).
 See MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.24.16 (“Except if the language of a specific
regulation indicates an intent by the Department [of Health and Mental Hygiene] to
provide reimbursement for covered services to [MA] Program recipients without
regard to the availability of federal financial participation, State regulations shall be
interpreted in conformity with applicable federal statutes and regulations.”); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (setting forth due process
standards in the termination of “statutory entitlements” and reiterating that the
“fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard”);
Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[i]f a state
participates in Medicaid, it must comply with federally mandated standards”).
 See Ferguson v. Loder, 975 A.2d 284, 294-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009)
(“[T]he Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to follow [the Supreme Court in]
Irwin with respect to conditions precedent under Maryland law. . . . Thus,
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determine whether a time limitation for bringing an action operates as
a statute of limitations—which may be waived under certain
conditions—or as a condition precedent to the action—which is nonwaivable and can be raised at any time because the action itself is
“fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied.”158 In harmonizing the
state and federal filing deadlines, Schreur v. Department of Human
Services159 and State v. Sharafeldin160 are instructive.
In Schreur, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed federal
Medicaid law when the Appellant filed a request for a fair hearing
368 days after the date of the notice and 278 days after the expiration
of the 90 day period.161 The Court of Appeals did not specifically
address whether the time limitation was in the nature of a statute of
limitations or jurisdictional but did address whether the time period
should be “tolled” because the denial notice “contained incorrect
citations to the” administrative regulations.162 While the Court
distinguished between an applicant and a recipient—which is not a
relevant factor in either the Maryland regulations or in the Michigan
Supreme Court’s judgment—Schreur’s tolling analysis suggested
that the timeframe was a more flexible statute of limitations.
In addition to Schreur, a number of courts have characterized
various appeal timeframes that are worded similarly to the federal
Medicaid regulation—although outside of medical assistance and
sometimes in the context of a traditional suit—as a statute of
limitations.163 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the filing
deadline is codified in the federal regulations rather than in the

Sharafeldin established a bright line between the treatment of conditions precedent
under Maryland law, and the more liberal treatment of jurisdictional requirements
under the FTCA and similar statutes by recent federal court decisions.”).
! See, e.g., Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 610 (Md. 2010); State v.
Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Md. 2004).
" 795 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 795
N.W.2d 124 (Mich. 2011).
 854 A.2d 1208 (Md. 2004).
 Schreur, 795 N.W.2d at 195.
 Id. at 195-96.
 See, e.g., Savina v. Litton Indus., 330 N.W.2d 456, 457; (Minn. 1983);
Wilson v. Shannon, 386 S.E.2d 257, 258 (S.C. 1989); Johnston v. Bowen, 437
S.E.2d 45, 64 (S.C. 1993); McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 176-77 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); Roemhildt v. Gresser Co., Inc., 729 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. 2007).
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authorizing statute. This congressional silence is far from a clear
legislative statement of jurisdictional intent.164
In Sharafeldin, which concerned a waiver of sovereign immunity
rather than a “statutory entitlement,” the Court of Appeals of
Maryland highlighted the use of the term “barred” in the applicable
statute and stated that “traditional statutes of limitations . . . normally
state only that an action ‘shall be filed within’ the allowable
period.”165 Indeed, Maryland’s MA regulation states that the request
for a fair hearing should be filed “within 90 days of the receipt of the
notification.”166 In light of the plain language of the limitation
period—and its placement in the regulation rather than in the
authorizing statute—the time limitation does not appear to be a
condition precedent to the right of action itself. The nature of the MA
filing deadline can most likely be characterized in harmony with
federal standards as an “administrative statute of limitations” that is
not an unwaivable condition precedent to the administrative right and
remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court and some state courts have highlighted,
jurisdictional deadlines are “drastic,” “serious,” and “final.” For over
a decade the Supreme Court has reigned in the “more than
occasional” misuse of the term “jurisdictional” to describe “emphatic
time prescriptions.”167 The perhaps reflexive reaction that a filing
deadline is inextricably intertwined with subject matter jurisdiction is
generally not supported outside of traditional appeals from one court
to another. Instead, the thread through the patchwork of state cases is
that the Legislature dictates whether a statutory filing timeframe is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an agency’s authority to hear a case. The
adjudicating agency should, therefore, carefully parse the relevant



See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013)
(explaining that “[t]his is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order
to speak clearly” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d at 1214.
 MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.04.04D.
 Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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agency statute and regulations for any flexibility in the filing
deadline, including any express good cause exceptions.
The sparse and often contradictory analyses among the states on a
rather fundamental aspect of administrative law—the nature of a
filing deadline for a contested case hearing—is troubling. An
adjudicating agency is often without guidance, which fosters
inefficiency and unfairness. Although a time limitation should not
stretch indefinitely, flexible due process should also not support an
unduly harsh deadline that may be overbroad and which may not
serve the public interest.168 While I have striven to bring some
cohesiveness to this area, I urge the states to visit—or revisit—this
subject and to follow the example of the Supreme Court in providing
greater clarity and uniformity in the area of administrative filing
guidelines.

! But see Poor, supra note 5, at 151-52 (“[P]ractical experience teaches that
the judicial system as a whole works far better—with greater stability and overall
fairness—when the time for an appeal cannot be manipulated by the parties or
overridden by the trial court and thus is treated as jurisdictional.”).

